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Abstract
Recently, many European local authorities have set up Urban Consolidation Centres (UCC) 
for dealing with challenges arising from the environmental and social impacts of logis-
tical activities in urban contexts through shipment synchronisation and carrier coordina-
tion policies. However, the number of successful UCC projects led by local authorities in 
Europe is low, with most of the UCCs failing to achieve financial sustainability after the 
initial experimental phase, which is often heavily supported by public funds. In order to 
propose mechanisms that could favour the economic and financial sustainability of UCC 
systems, this research develops an adaptation of game-theoretic approaches to the prob-
lems of responsibility and cost allocation among stakeholders participating in a UCC deliv-
ery network. A solution based on the Shapley Value concept is employed to derive cost 
allocations; applications of the model to a real-world scenario are evaluated. An extensive 
sensitivity analysis shows that the proposed cost allocation rules can provide alternative 
arrangements, based on extended responsibility concepts, which can alleviate the burden 
on local authorities for the set up of UCCs. As such, results provide useful policy and prac-
tice implications on how to safeguard UCCs’ viability under different scenarios, including 
the outsourcing of the last-mile deliveries.
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1 Introduction
Urban Freight Transportation (UFT) only accounts for 15% of the total vehicle movements 
in urban areas. However, such a number of movements contributes significantly to city con-
gestion due to the large size of vehicles employed for goods distribution (Paddeu, 2018); 
indeed, UFT produces 30–40% of transport carbon emission (Browne, 2019). Coherently 
to the recently introduced Sustainable Development Goals, the European Union requires 
emissions from the transport industry to be reduced by 60% (compared to 1990 levels) 
within 2050 (European Comission, 2011). In this context, different categories of measures 
for sustainable urban logistics (SUL) (including market-based measures; regulatory meas-
ures; land use planning; infrastructural solutions; adoption of new technologies) are being 
implemented in order to achieve objectives linked to sustainable urban development (Sta-
thopoulos et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2020).
As an infrastructural response to these challenges, many local authorities (LAs), also 
through the establishment of public–private partnerships, have set up Urban Consolidation 
Centres (UCCs) for dealing with last-mile distribution, as an attempt to deal with negative 
impacts of logistics in urban contexts through a freight consolidation strategy (Dablanc 
et al., 2011). UCCs are normally located on the outskirt of urban areas. UCC-based mech-
anisms encompass coordination among different carriers and shippers, require long haul 
carriers to deliver their loads of goods at UCCs, where such loads go through unloading, 
sorting, and cross-docking processes (Miao et  al., 2012), before being consolidated and 
delivered to the final user through the usage of a fleet of smaller and environmentally-
friendly (electrical or gas) vehicles (Martinez-Sykora et  al., 2020). Complex structures 
based on multiple tiers of UCCs also emerged, particularly in the case of large metropol-
itan areas, and related optimisation challenges were tackled in the literature (Crainic & 
Sgalambro, 2014; Crainic et al., 2009).
It has been shown that UCCs can contribute to the improvement of environmental 
quality in cities by reducing air pollution and alleviating congestion (Browne et al., 2005, 
2011). Furthermore, UCCs can help long-haul carriers to solve the complexity of urban 
deliveries through value-adding services (e.g. just-in-time); also, customers (e.g. retail 
stores, catering establishments) in urban areas can save cost by reducing the need for ware-
house space (Browne et al., 2005).
Notwithstanding these encouraging premises, the number of successful UCC projects in 
Europe is very low and most of them have experienced serious difficulties in going beyond 
the experimental phase (Paddeu, 2018). Indeed, most of the UCCs fail to achieve financial 
sustainability and to operate autonomously after the initial experimental phase that might 
be heavily supported by public funds. Local and central governments might invest consid-
erable capital in the start-up process of UCCs in order to alleviate environmental and social 
issues related to logistics in urban areas (Allen et al., 2012; Browne et al., 2005). However, 
unless the use of UCC facilities is mandatory for all shipments to and from the considered 
urban areas, in most cases UCCs cannot attain long-term sustainability due to the relatively 
low volume of users who typically subscribe to these types of projects (Janjevic & Ndi-
aye, 2017a). It has to be highlighted, indeed, that the last-mile distribution process suffers 
from significantly higher costs than other long-haul freight transport activities (Lindholm 
& Behrends, 2012) due to the impact from resident density, restrictive policies, and inher-
ent spatial constraints which can be found urban environments (Gevaers et al., 2014). As 
such, last-mile distribution costs can account for up to 75% of the total cost of supply chain 
logistics (Devari et al., 2017).
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Both private and public stakeholders are involved in UCC delivery networks (Anand 
et al., 2012). Private stakeholders include: (i) long-haul carriers; (ii) local carriers associ-
ated with the UCC; (iii) consumers; (iv) goods’ suppliers. On the other hand, LAs are the 
most prominent category of public stakeholders involved in these networks (Taniguchi & 
Tamagawa, 2005, Browne et al., 2007, Allen et al., 2012, Behrends, 2016, de Oliveira & 
de Oliveira, 2017). The attributes and interests of different stakeholders cause the hetero-
geneity of their behaviours and objectives in the functioning of UCC networks (Gatta & 
Marcucci, 2014; Marcucci et al., 2017; Taniguchi & Tamagawa, 2005); as such, it is not 
uncommon that different categories of stakeholders in UCC networks will have very differ-
ent priorities (Kin et al., 2016). When conceiving solutions for freight transport, the main 
challenge is to satisfy the interests of all stakeholders (Vieira et  al., 2015, Sanz, 2018); 
however, due to lack of resources, it might be extremely challenging for LAs to harmonise 
different objectives (across the economic, environmental and social dimensions) associated 
with different categories of private stakeholders (Akgün et  al., 2019). Private stakehold-
ers seldom integrate their logistical planning process or daily business operations into the 
overall sustainable development strategies of LAs (Dablanc, 2007); in other words, there is 
a distinctive boundary of responsibility and lack of co-operation among stakeholders. Such 
responsibility issues are likely to work against the promotion of collaborative projects in 
Urban Logistics and exacerbate financial issues experienced by UCCs.
Sustainable urban logistics should be aimed at reducing the total social cost of urban 
goods movements (Ogden, 1992). As such, all stakeholders should understand that SUL 
principles are aimed at promoting financial and non-financial benefits for all members in a 
supply chain (Morana & Gonzalez-Feliu, 2015). In circumstances where financial rewards 
cannot be achieved in the short term, mechanisms are needed for establishing fair and effi-
cient cost-sharing for stakeholders participating in UCC networks. This is required for 
UCCs to achieve financial sustainability and promote responsibility sharing schemes aimed 
at overcoming the initial situation where such facilities are merely depending on subsidies 
from local and national governments. Within this context, this research aims to develop an 
adaptation of established game-theoretic approaches to the problem of responsibility and 
cost allocation among stakeholders participating in a UCC delivery network. The proposed 
models will allow the establishment of responsibility sharing schemes aimed at promoting 
the financial sustainability of UCCs.
Proposed approaches are derived from the theory of Unlimited Territorial Integrity 
(Ambec & Sprumont, 2002), which has been previously applied to the Supply Chain con-
text (Ciardiello et al., 2020). A solution based on the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953) con-
cept will be employed to calculate the numerical results for cost allocations, under different 
responsibility scenarios. Applications of the model to a real-world scenario will be then 
evaluated, in order to draw useful policy and practice implications.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect.  2, a literature review is provided; after a 
general introduction to collaborative solutions to urban freight transportation problems, the 
paper focuses on modelling approaches based on both optimisation and game theory. Some 
research gaps are identified, related to scenarios in which collaborative solutions (such as 
UCCs) are set up by Local Authorities. The paper also highlights that, in these contexts, 
the fairness of cost-sharing rules is a desirable property, given the conflictual nature of 
stakeholders’ preferences. In Sect. 3, we clarify the contribution of the current paper. In 
Sect.  4, we propose the game-theoretical model for UCC networks, which is an adapta-
tion of the so-called River Problem (Dong et al., 2012; Ni & Wang, 2007); we adopt new 
responsibility concepts; according to them, we present the numerical formulation of the 
Shapley value. In Sect. 5, we implement our model and we derive cost allocations for a 
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particular case study; an extensive sensitivity analysis is performed, which allows drawing 
some interesting implications. Finally, conclusions are provided in Sect. 6.
2  Literature review
2.1  Collaborative urban logistics in urban consolidation centres
Collaborative freight transportation involves the creation of partnerships involving two or 
more actors aiming at achieving specific business goals through the utilisation of shared 
assets (Lambert et al., 1999; Pomponi et al., 2013). In the field of urban logistics, Cleo-
phas et al. (2019) classify the UCC network as a vertical initiative of collaborative urban 
freight transportation (CUFT), in which goods flow across partners who are in a multi-tier 
structural relationship. As a vertical CUFT system, UCC based delivery mechanisms can 
be regarded as a two-echelon delivery network (Nozick & Turnquist, 2001). Parcels are 
transhipped to an intermediate facility before being moved to an urban area (Guastaroba 
et al., 2016). After that, sustainable methods, such as light or electric vehicles are utilised 
for goods distribution within the urban area (Gonzalez-Feliu, 2008).
A typical UCC system requires the setup of a collaborative network involving upstream 
and downstream stakeholders, including upstream long-haul carriers (LHCs), suppliers, 
and downstream customers, in order to intercept and merge goods flows to be delivered in 
an urban area (Cleophas et al., 2019). Van Heeswijk et al. (2019) identified two different 
types of UCC business models according to the categories of UCC subscribers. In the first 
model, LHCs outsource their last-mile delivery business to an UCC, which consolidates 
goods from multiple LHCs, and deliver them to the customers in the urban area; Brussels 
UCC operates according to this model (Janjevic & Ndiaye, 2017b). In the second category 
of UCCs, downstream customers (e.g. retailers, restaurants) designate the UCC facility as 
a consolidation point in order to activate collaborative delivery mechanisms in the urban 
area. This model includes the operational UCCs for perishable products in Parma (Italy) 
(Morganti & Gonzalez-Feliu, 2015) and Nijmegen (The Netherlands) (Duin et al., 2016) 
and the British UCCs serving the Regent Street area in London (Browne et al., 2011) and 
the Bristol-Bath conurbation (Duin et al., 2016).
2.2  Financial sustainability of UCCs
While UCCs can provide great environmental and social advantages, their financial sus-
tainability, along with their transition to autonomously-funded projects, which are not 
heavily relying on governmental support, is a challenging proposition. Even if govern-
ments invest considerable capital in the initial stage of the UCC project, this might not 
achieve long-term sustainability (Allen et al., 2012). Historically, the low volume of users 
subscribing to UCC facilities has caused financial issues; indeed, most of these schemes 
have been implemented voluntarily. As such, it is hard for UCCs to achieve financial avail-
ability through service fees (Paddeu, 2018). Four main factors can produce such issues:
– Given the extremely fragmented nature of the urban freight transport market (in which 
a plethora of small companies and self-employed drivers operate) (Paddeu, 2018), it is 
difficult for UCCs to capture significant market shares in last-mile logistics (Allen et al., 
2014; van Duin et al., 2010).
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– Due to the need to introduce further sorting and merging processes, UCC schemes 
might generate extra fees for all the actors involved in the entire supply chain (Van 
Rooijen & Quak, 2010). In addition, as profit margins in the urban freight market are 
generally low, shippers are reluctant to join UCC projects and to hand over one of the 
most lucrative portions of their value chain to an external entity (Van Rooijen & Quak, 
2010).
– Many carriers might already autonomously achieve high truck-load rates; as such, they 
can realise efficient shipments. This will prevent them to subscribe to UCC facilities 
(Olsson & Woxenius, 2014).
– Many UCC projects are originally built for experimental purposes; such attempts gen-
erally exhibit a weak stakeholders’ engagement and communication during the plan-
ning stage, making the transition to a fully operational project extremely difficult (Tsiu-
lin et al., 2017).
Besides the above-mentioned issues, high fixed costs (typically faced by LAs) represent 
another financial constraint for UCC projects (Quak & Tavasszy, 2011). LAs might be able 
to set up UCCs thanks to grants or external funding (Duin et  al., 2016, Paddeu, 2018); 
however, many UCC projects suffer losses from the very initial stage of their operations, 
failing to reach commercial viability (Janjevic & Ndiaye, 2017a; van Duin et  al., 2010). 
In this context, LAs need to support UCCs, with subsidies which can also cover 40% 
of the total expenditure of an UCC, as stated by Duin et al. (2016). This might result in 
UCC operations being discontinued when the original grant (or public subsidy) terminates 
(Browne et  al., 2005; Duin et  al., 2016; Kin et  al., 2016). Subsidies increase the finan-
cial burden for public authorities (Duin et al., 2016; Kin et al., 2016); besides that, under 
certain regulations, persistent public support to UCCs can violate competition rules (Pad-
deu, 2018). For the purpose of promoting the adoption of UCCs, LAs might need to use 
restrictive policies (such as congestion and emission charges), in order to force LHCs to 
join such schemes, or to penalise them from an economic point of view (Allen et al., 2012; 
Björklund et al., 2017; Ville et al., 2013); however, imposing such measures could generate 
legal feuds between LAs and private companies.
2.3  Cost‑allocation mechanisms for UCCs
According to both the academic and grey literature, current mechanisms require individual 
LHCs to join UCC schemes. Therefore, UCC facilities operators, or LAs (which mainly act 
as sponsors of the project) need to assume the financial responsibility for UCC operations. 
Such mechanisms might cause low uptake rates (e.g. for LHCs) and exacerbate UCC finan-
cial issues (Battaia et al., 2014). As such, the current expectation for local governments is 
to find ways to promote responsibility sharing for UCC operations, in such a way to pro-
duce shared allocations of logistical costs, with the main aim of sustaining the viability of 
UCCs (Allen et al., 2012; Browne et al., 2005; Marcucci & Danielis, 2008). Specifically, 
LAs should seek to build coalitions aimed at involving more stakeholders in the function-
ing of UCC facility, through participatory cost-sharing mechanisms.
As such, cost allocation rules should span across individual stakeholders’ business 
boundaries, implementing extended responsibility rules capable of providing a compre-
hensive view of the whole logistics chain. Also, cost allocation mechanisms should pro-
vide rules for sharing the overall cost of the logistical activities taking place within the 
UCC network, involving all stakeholders in a multi-tier position according to fairness and 
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efficiency principles. In practice, complex negotiations are required to enable the distribu-
tion of costs and benefits among agents (Kurnia & Johnston, 2001). Considering this, mod-
els and methods aimed at performing such allocations could be of help to policy-makers 
willing to adopt UCC solutions in urban contexts.
Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016) performed a very detailed review of cost-allocation 
methods in transportation problems, albeit not restricting their focus to the urban setting 
(and, therefore, to UCCs). In particular, collaboration or cooperation might be expressed 
through the willingness of sharing logistical resources or accepting the negative externali-
ties due to freight transportation activities. Cooperation might involve different tangible 
and intangible assets; how to distribute profits or how to allocate costs is the key problem 
for setting up such collaborations. According to Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016), coop-
erative game-theoretical models are particularly suited for solving this type of problem. 
Within this context, the most employed game-theoretical approach is the one based on the 
concept of the core. Such a concept (and its ad-hoc developed variations) appears one of 
the most naturally adaptable ones to the transportation context, given its property of indi-
vidual rationality. Such a property can very naturally describe the desired tout court stabil-
ity of the collaboration among the members of the logistical network (see, for instance: Dai 
& Chen, 2012; Padilla Tinoco, 2017; Hezarkhani et al., 2019).
Let (N,υ) be a pair where N is the set of players and the function υ is defined of the 
superset of N. The function υ(T) describes the value of collaboration of players in a given 
subset T ⊆ N. The pair (N,υ) is called a Transferable Utility (TU) game. Classical solutions 
address an aggregation issue, trying to summarise information from TU games into sin-
gle allocations/payoffs assigned to each of the players. Within this context, the individual 
rationality property of the core incorporates the desirable incentive to join a coalition, 
meaning that each participant is better off with the collaborative allocation than with its 
initial endowment υ(i).
Among the other approaches which have been employed for promoting collaboration 
among stakeholders engaged in a logistical system, Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016) also 
cite the study by Vanovermeire et al. (2014) based on the Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953).
Shapley (1953) succeeded in providing the following four conditions on the transforma-
tion from a TU-game into an allocation that can be fairly said to be natural:
– The symmetry axiom: if two participants equally contribute to the worth of any coali-
tion, i.e. υ(T), then they must have the same Shapley value.
– The efficiency axiom: the sum of individual Shapley values must be equal to the worth 
of the whole grand coalition.
– The dummy-player axiom: participant who does not contribute to any coalition must 
have a null value.
– The additivity axiom: let us have two TU games on the same set of players. For each 
TU game, each player has a Shapley value. Let us construct the sum-game of the previ-
ous two games. Then, individual Shapley values of the sum game are equal to the sum 
of the two initial Shapley values.
The Shapley value has been also used for sharing mechanisms in transportation as a 
form of incentives for companies to join the full collaboration, even if it does not necessar-
ily satisfy individual rationality (Vanovermeire et al., 2014).
Dai and Chen (2012) studied the stability multiple carriers’ alliance if carriers share 
their transportation requests, vehicle capacities in order to increase vehicle utilization rates 
and reduce empty back hauls; they employ the Shapley value to re-allocate profits among 
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the multiple carriers. This is done as to maintain the stability of the alliance among car-
riers. Significantly, the authors prove that the Shapley value is in the core. As also shown 
by Dahlberg et al. (2019), if an allocation mechanism satisfies both fairness and individual 
rationality properties, then there is good hope to provide strong incentives that can foster 
stakeholders’ collaboration.
Hezarkhani et al. (2019) studied the relationship between a UCC and its suppliers; col-
laboration here is intended as stakeholders’ willingness to process goods through the UCC, 
in order to reduce the unit costs for UCCs through the achievement of economies of scale. 
Profits achieved by the UCC profits are shared with participants in order to provide an 
incentive aimed at fostering collaboration.
2.4  Research gaps
Despite the growing literature on UCCs in urban contexts, little attention has been devoted 
to the specific development of allocation mechanisms for the start-up phase of UCCs led 
by local authorities.
In general, the challenges of urban logistics may vary across countries, cities, and pro-
jects. The overall aim of allocation schemes is to mitigate negative impacts, without having 
a negative influence on the functionality of urban logistical systems (e.g., shippers, trans-
port companies, receivers, end customers, public administrations). It must be remarked 
that, in an urban context, negative externalities associated with freight transportation rep-
resent the main reason for which local authorities establish UCCs; as such, the mitiga-
tion of these externalities represent the prime objective for local authorities. Consequently, 
individual rationality should not be seen as the main property to be respected by allocation 
schemes for the urban context. In other words, allocation rules are not to be solely meant as 
incentives to form collaboration among stakeholders. Taniguchi (2014) discusses the role 
of municipalities in promoting sustainable urban logistics solutions. Municipalities provide 
coordination, advice, and infrastructures, along with investment for the start-up phase of 
the UCC. However, Taniguchi (2014) also points out that UCCs (and, in general, urban 
logistics projects) should not depend too heavily on financial support from the municipality 
in the long run. It is therefore fundamental that municipalities build mechanisms aimed at 
helping the start-up phase of UCC but seek to recover the initial investment through cost-
reduction and economies of scale.
Despite their individual rationality, stakeholders may perceive as fair the regulatory role 
of municipalities (Kiba-Janiak, 2016). Within this context, allocation rules can become a 
helpful tool for local authorities, willing to adopt UCC solutions for protecting their urban 
area from the negative externalities of urban freight transport. It must be noticed that there 
is a dearth of research on these specific aspects. Some initial attempts to study allocation 
schemes when the municipality is somehow dominant have been provided by Dahlberg 
et al. (2018). Van Heeswijk et al. (2020) provided an agent-based model for the study of 
urban logistics systems set up by local authorities; the result of those simulations shows 
that the implementation of UCCs can considerably reduce negative externalities deriving 
from urban freight transport; however, a detailed scenario analysis confirms that such poli-
cies might not achieve financial viability.
As such, as explained in the previous sections, appropriate cost allocations rules are a 
stringent need in order for UCCs to achieve financial sustainability and promote respon-
sibility sharing schemes aimed at overcoming the initial situation where such facili-
ties are merely depending on subsidies from local and national governments. Our focus 
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is complementary to the emerging literature on gain sharing mechanisms for UCCs 
(Hezarkhani et al., 2019), but more devoted to the start-up phase of the facility.
Specifically, this paper considers the opportunity of involving a wider set of stakehold-
ers in a coalition, which could participate to cost-sharing mechanisms associated with the 
operation of a UCC facility run by a local authority. To the best of our knowledge, no 
study, to date, has paid attention to cost allocation issues in order to sustain the existence of 
UCCs and, as a second criterion, to promote the participation of stakeholders according to 
fairness principles (Dahlberg et al., 2019).
3  Contribution of the study
According to the current literature and state-of-practice, the most widely adopted cost-
sharing mechanism requires operators and LAs to assume economic and financial respon-
sibility for UCC operations. Notwithstanding, the pivotal role of cost-sharing policies to 
share financial burdens among a wider set of different classes of stakeholders (including 
Suppliers, Long-haul Carriers, Retailers) and successfully implement advanced consolida-
tion-based logistics strategies were widely evidenced in the literature (Schaffer, 2000; Kur-
nia & Johnston, 2001; Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016; Verdonck et al., 2016).
In this paper, we adopt a game-theoretic approach in order to evaluate the impact of differ-
ent cost-sharing strategies. The approach is aimed at negotiating more sustainable allocations 
of both economic efforts and practical benefits, to maximise involvement in a UCC network. 
Indeed, such a strategy seeks to involve more stakeholders in contributing to the total cost 
of the UCC facility, in order to improve the prospects of financial autonomy and viability of 
such facilities. Specifically, this paper considers the opportunity to involve Suppliers (which 
originate the flows of goods through their manufacturing processes), Long-haul Carriers 
(LHC) (which take care of transporting such flows of goods), and Customers (whose demand 
for goods can be seen as the ultimate reason for the activation of such logistical flows).
From a theoretical standpoint, the legitimacy of involving suppliers into cost allocation 
mechanisms in UCC networks can be derived from an Extended Producer Responsibility 
(EPR) view. EPR requires producers’ responsibility to be extended to the life cycle of a 
product. Specifically, goods producers should take responsibility for all the environmental 
impacts and externalities associated with the product’s service life, also including end-of-
life options (Lindhqvist & Lifset, 2003); the usage of EPR schemes represents a policy 
which can mitigate the negative environmental and social impacts arising from production 
activities (Spicer & Johnson, 2004). Based on the above-mentioned principles, it is reason-
able for producers to take responsibility for logistical activities related to the distribution 
of their products; logistical processes, indeed, represent a key segment in the life cycle of 
the products. Coherently, according to such view, suppliers can be required to mitigate the 
negative environmental and social effects caused by goods transportation; the participation 
to the functioning of UCC schemes can be seen as a way to implement such logic.
A similar argument can be employed for the involvement of LHCs. Typically, LHCs 
contribute to UCC operations as such facilities merge goods from different carriers and 
deliver them to the final customers in the urban area. Again, this participation in costs of 
UCCs can be seen as a way to ask LHCs to be accountable for the detrimental effects (on 
the environmental dimension) of their activities. Also, participation in UCCs can be bene-
ficial for intercity shippers, as delivery consolidation can lead to short travel times and effi-
ciency improvements through off-peak deliveries goods into UCCs; also, thanks to UCCs, 
LHCs can avoid dealing with the intricacies of last-mile deliveries (such as time-windows 
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or traffic restrictions). On this basis, it seems reasonable to ask LHCs to participate in cost-
sharing schemes for the functioning of UCCs.
From a theoretical standpoint, the legitimacy of involving customers into cost allocation 
mechanisms in UCC networks can be derived from an Extended Customer Responsibility 
(ECR) view (Sheu & Choi, 2019). The idea of ECR is novel and can be described as the 
need for customers to take responsibility for the “societal harm” caused by the commodi-
ties or services they want to obtain. When ECR principles are implemented in the field 
of SUL, it calls customers to be responsible for the adverse effects, which are caused by 
the delivery processes of goods, or services they purchase. Extending such an idea to a 
UCC network, customers can be seen as the receivers of the final goods; their purchas-
ing behaviour generates demand for logistical activities, which leads to environmental and 
social issues. However, customers have significant potential in improving the overall envi-
ronmental performances of a supply chain through purchasing aggregation and consolida-
tion (Vachon, 2006). Within such logic, and coherently to an ECR scheme, it can appear 
reasonable to ask customers to contribute to the functioning costs of UCCs, to alleviate the 
environmental consequences of logistical activities generated by their demand.
4  A game‑theoretic model for cost allocation in UCC networks
The model developed in this paper is an adaptation to the UCC context of the fundamental 
contribution of (Ni & Wang, 2007). Such an allocation approach was originally developed 
in the field of environmental economics, for the so-called polluted river problem. This 
problem can be briefly described as follows: there is a river that can be divided into n 
segments; in each segment, a manufacturing company is generating pollutants, which are 
contaminating the river into this river. In order to mitigate their environmental impact on 
the river, each company must contribute to the cost of cleaning activities. Several exten-
sions and variants to this problem have been introduced in the literature (see, for instance: 
Alcalde-Unzu, et al. 2015; van den Brink et al, 2018; Gudmundsson et al., 2019). However, 
in general, three principles can be followed for the allocation of the costs of such activities:
– A Local Responsibility principle (LR), according to which each company is strictly 
responsible for the cleaning costs, related to the production activities strictly happening 
at its premises (and, therefore, within their river portion).
– An Upstream Responsibility principle (UR), stating that companies located upstream 
are responsible not only for pollution happening at their premises, but will also pollute 
portions located downstream, and should be held responsible for this, participating in 
cleaning costs.
– A Downstream Responsibility principle (DR), stating that downstream companies located 
along the river should participate in cleaning activities for upstream portions of the river.
Based on the LR, DR, and UR principles mentioned in the above section, three allo-
cation methods can be proposed: Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS), Upstream Equal 
Sharing (UES), and Downstream Equal Sharing (DES) methods (Dong et al., 2012; Ni & 
Wang, 2007).
In this paper, an adaptation of this framework will be developed to the cost allocation 
problem in the context of a UCC delivery network, under the following assumptions (see 
Fig. 1):
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– Different stakeholders are cooperating in a multi-tier delivery chain;
– Parcels will be moved from upstream stakeholders (i.e., suppliers) to downstream ones 
(i.e., customers).
Under such assumptions, a typical UCC based freight transport chain can be consid-
ered. Such a transport chain can be regarded as including a finite set N of n different stake-
holders linked together by a set of goods moving processes (GMPs). Such GMPs can be 
represented as a set of links L, which are connecting stakeholders operating in the net-
work. Therefore, the number of stakeholders is equal to the number of GMPs, that is |L| =n. 
According to this feature, we consider these GMPs in an upstream–downstream structure. 
Each link  Li is associated with a label (cost), denoted by ci and representing the cost of 
the GMP for moving a parcel delivers from stakeholder i to stakeholder i + 1. We refer 
to c = (c1, c2,… , cn) ∈ R
n
+
 as the cost vector. The cost-share of stakeholder i is denoted 
by x
i
 . We say that the vector x = (x1, x2,… , xn) ∈ R
n
+
 is the stakeholders’ cost allocation 










 . See Fig. 1 for a graphical representation of our model. Cost Allocation 
rules may be defined in order to define the vector x. Ni and Wang (2007) and Dong et al. 
(2012) introduce cost allocations for the above-mentioned river problem. In particular, such 
cost allocation rules become the Shapley Value of specific games in characteristic form, 
which satisfies the efficiency property. We use such cost allocation rules in our settings. 
In our context, cost allocations given by the same allocation rule respect the principle of 
fairness against the above-mentioned principles of responsibility. A similar interpretation 
for cost allocation in supply chains has been given in (Ciardiello et al., 2020; Granot et al., 
2014). According to the Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS) rule, stakeholder i is the only 
one responsible for the delivery costs ci. The latter means that xi = ci.
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Fig. 1  Typical UCC based Freight Transport Chain
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Each stakeholder is responsible for the costs of GMPs which happen downstream of his 
position in the delivery network (including the cost of GMP at his premises).
A downstream equal sharing (DES) rule is represented by the following cost allocation rule:
Each stakeholder is responsible for the costs of GMPs which happen upstream of his 
position in the delivery network (including the cost of GMP at his premises).
4.1  Model properties
As described in Ciardiello et al. (2020), the allocation rules introduced in the previous sec-
tion are characterised by several desirable properties, which become very relevant in the 
context of UCC delivery networks as described in the following Table 1.
The no free riding and equal sharing of extra costs are desirable properties since they 
allow stakeholders in the delivery network to be protected from opportunistic behaviours 
from remaining participants. Even if stakeholders have a collaborative behaviour, some 
increases in logistical costs could occur over time. Such a change should be treated fairly in 
terms of further burdens on stakeholders. Interestingly, UES and DES cost allocation rules 
satisfy the above properties (Ciardiello et al., 2020).
The unilateral disaggregation stability ensures that stakeholders do not have any conven-
ience to disaggregate their activities over delivery networks. By disaggregation, we mean 
the splitting of activities of a stakeholder into two separate entities under the ownership 
of the same stakeholder itself. Our cost allocations rules satisfy the unilateral disaggrega-
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Table 1  Structure of operational cost in UCC (Janjevic & Ndiaye, 2017a)
Property Relevance for UCC networks
Equal Sharing of Extra costs If there is an increase in total operational costs, it is required that 
companies responsible for this increase should be equally affected 
by extra burdens
No free riding This property requires that if the total costs increase, but, at the same 
time, for some firms, the costs of the processes they are responsible 
for remains unchanged, the allocation for these firms should remain 
the same
Unilateral disaggregation stability If a stakeholder disaggregates its own activities into two different 
companies (under its ownership; for instance, by creating a subsidi-
ary company being in charge of certain logistical processes), then 
the sum of cost allocations for these two new entities is larger than 
the cost allocation for the original stakeholder
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network might be penalised (through a higher total logistical cost) if it decides to split its 
logistical activities across two entities characterised by the same ownership.
The following section details the application of the allocation rules to a case study.
5  Case study
The purpose of this section is to measure, assess, and compare the effects deriving from the 
adoption of different cost-sharing strategies whilst managing a UCC delivery network (as 
shown in Fig. 1). To this aim, the above-defined and described cost allocation rules (LRS, 
UES, and DES) are applied here to the experimental framework introduced by Janjevic and 
Ndiaye (2017a, b), based on a UCC located in the urban area of Brussels (Belgium). Jan-
jevic and Ndiaye (2017a, b) originally adopted this UCC as a testbed for their theoretical 
framework, aimed at verifying the financial viability of UCC cross-docking and consolida-
tion operations. The accurate characterisation of the logistical costs presented by Janjevic 
and Ndiaye (2017a, b) allows a realistic evaluation of the impact of the cost allocation 
mechanisms.
It must be noted that, in this paper, the case study is employed for a slightly different 
purpose: while Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017a, b) focus their analysis on demonstrating how 
profitable operations are subject to an efficient use of resources, we are interested here in 
exploring the impact of different cost allocation policies on individual actors’ profitability. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous contributions have performed similar analyses 
in the extant literature. As such, the considered experimental framework went through a 
careful adaptation process in order to make it suitable for our experiments, as described in 
the following.
We hypothesise a network composed of the following stakeholders, linked together by 
respective GMPs: (i) Suppliers; (ii) Long-haul carriers (LHCs); (iii) UCC operators; (iv) 
Customers.
According to Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017a), the logistical costs which can be attributed 
to the presence of a UCC include: (1) last-mile delivery costs and (2) in-facility goods 
handling costs (encompassing goods trans-shipment and handling costs and other general 
administrative costs related to the UCC). Values for these two types of costs (for typical 
parcels) have been validated by Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017a) as in Table 2.
Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017b) propose a cost modelling approach aimed at comparing 
costs faced by LHCs under different scenarios. When an LHC performs a delivery through 
a direct shipment, costs faced by the LHC include: (i) costs generated by the main freight 
movement, involving the shipment to the service area and the return to the depot after the 
completion of the delivery; (ii) costs generated by ordinary freight movements, for deliv-
ering goods to each customer in the service area (Fig. 2, top). When an LHC decides to 
utilise a UCC, costs faced include: (i) costs generated by the return trips between the LHC 
depot and the UCC; (ii) costs generated by dwell time at the UCC; (iii) costs generated by 
the payment for the UCC service (Fig. 2).
Table 2  Structure of operational 
cost in UCC (Janjevic & Ndiaye, 
2017a)
Types of cost Values Percentage
Last-mile delivery costs €2.08/parcel 67.8%
In-facility goods handling costs €0.99/parcel 32.2%
Total costs €3.07/parcel 100.0%
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As such, Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017b) assume that the total cost faced by an LHC will 
be different under the two scenarios. In particular, if the LHC needs to serve a small num-
ber of customers (and, as a result, needs to deliver a small number of parcels) in each trip, 
the strategy of outsourcing the last-mile delivery to a UCC could reduce the costs faced by 
the LHC. Conversely, using a UCC can increase the costs faced by the LHCs if the LHC is 
shipping a large number of goods, thus achieving full truckload shipments. This can hap-
pen when large LHCs already achieve high consolidation by themselves, thus reducing the 
average shipping cost per parcel. Under these conditions, service fees charged by UCCs, 
along with handling and administrative costs and dwell times, might make the UCC option 
unattractive.
Indeed, if the cost of direct shipping is lower than the one faced using the UCC, LHCs 
will certainly decide not to outsource urban delivery processes to a UCC, unless LAs are 
adopting very stringent restrictions on private freight movement. As a result, UCCs might 
face difficulties in attracting customers, despite the proven environmental and social ben-
efits associated with these facilities. Within this context, the proposed cost allocation rules 
could be employed, by LAs, to promote cost alleviation mechanisms for LHCs who are 
already able to achieve high consolidation factors and might then be reluctant to subscribe 
to UCC facilities.
As such, the considered Case Study is based on the assumption that LHCs cannot get an 
economic benefit from accessing UCC services (Janjevic & Ndiaye, 2017b). According to 
the scenario considered by Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017b), this would happen if the LHC is 
transporting more than 17 parcels in a typical delivery trip. In accordance with their find-
ings, we focus on a setting where the considered LHC is delivering 50 parcels in its service 
area. According to the formulas and the parameters of the service area (such as the location 
of the depot and of the UCC, vehicle types, and service charge, information are shown in 
the Appendix) provided by Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017b), we calculate the cost for an LHC 
with and without using the UCC (Table 3). Besides the above discussion, we also assume 
that when LHCs outsource their urban distribution to a UCC, the goods supply, and receipt 
GMPs generate no extra cost. Under this scenario, LHCs might have no interest in access-
ing UCC services, as they could face lower costs by implementing a direct delivery policy.
Fig. 2  Typical Delivery Process with (bottom)/without (top) UCC  (adapted from Janjevic & Ndiaye, 
2017b)
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As mentioned, LAs could try to incentivise the participation of large LHCs in the UCC 
by using the mentioned cost allocation rules. According to DES and UES cost-sharing pol-
icies, the additional costs faced by LHCs (arising from the outsourcing of last-mile deliv-
eries to an UCC operator) could be shared with the upstream/downstream stakeholders 
(including suppliers and customers).
Based on the data from these two studies, we propose the cost structure of parcel deliv-
ery in a UCC network in Table 4. Here, only additional costs generated by the adoption of 
UCC services are accounted for and considered for cost-sharing purposes.
According to the principles formulated in the above sections, the results provided by 
cost-sharing schemes based on the LRS, UES, and DES are illustrated in Table 5.
Under the LRS rule, each participant is only responsible for the immediate GMP they 
contribute to. In this case, UCCs will benefit from both UES and DES principles. The 
UES principle reduces UCC’s cost to €1.02/parcel, with the percentage of the UCC cost 
decreasing from 67.06% to 22.35%. The DES principle lowers the contribution of the 
UCC to €2.04 /parcel (44.51%). In addition, the DES rule also alleviates the extra costs 
faced by a LHC to €0.50/parcel, with the percentage of the cost for LHC decreasing 
from 32.94% to 10.98%. Table 4 illustrates that the UES strategy provides the most con-
venient allocation for the UCC. The DES strategy can be convenient both for UCC and 
LHC.
Table 3  Costs for LHCs—direct delivery and UCC delivery (Janjevic & Ndiaye, 2017b)
Total parcels to be 
delivered in the urban 
area
Total cost for LHC direct 
delivery (€/parcel)
Total cost for LHC 
through UCC delivery  
(€/parcel)
Additional cost faced 
by LHC through UCC 
delivery (€/parcel)
50 2.75 4.26 1.51
Table 4  GMP costs to be shared by Stakeholders (€/parcel)
Types of stakeholders Types of GMP Cost of GMPs for allocation 
(€ per parcel)
Supplier Goods supply €0
LHC Long-haul transportation €1.51
UCC Urban delivery from UCC €3.07
Customer Goods receipt €0
Table 5  Cost Allocation According to LRS, UES, and DES rules (€/parcel)
Types of stakeholders LRS (€) LRS (%) UES (€) UES (%) DES (€) DES (%)
Supplier 0.00 0.00% 1.78 38.82% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.51 32.94% 1.78 38.82% 0.50 10.98%
UCC 3.07 67.06% 1.02 22.35% 2.04 44.51%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 2.04 44.51%
Total 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00%
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UES and DES rules have a clear cost-sharing mechanism for members across the 
UCC delivery network. The UES rule significantly helps the UCC that transferring its 
costs to upstream stakeholders. Such a rule responds to an Extended Producer Respon-
sibility principle. Conversely, the DES rule successfully involves final customers in the 
cost-sharing system. It emphasizes that customers, as the generator of the city logistics 
activities, also need to contribute to the functioning of urban logistics activities, through 
an Extended Consumer Responsibility principle.
It is clear that, while UES and DES schemes can provide an advantage to the author-
ity managing the UCC, other involved stakeholders (e.g., suppliers and customers) might 
feel penalised from such allocations, which could produce extra costs for them. As such, it 
is worth noticing that compromise solutions can be adopted, by developing convex com-
binations of the different rules. For instance, a mixed allocation rule, based on a convex 
combination of LRS and DES approaches could be developed. This can be seen as a way to 
partially correct the LRS rule (which is the de-facto approach adopted in most cases).
Table 6 illustrates the result provided by such hybrid rules.
Of course, as the proportion devoted to LRS increases, stakeholders’ cost allocations 
will be closer to the original ones. Weights to be assigned to the different responsibility 
rules could be then seen as the object of negotiations among different stakeholders in 
order to achieve a compromise agreement, which could be agreed upon by upstream and 
downstream stakeholders.
5.1  Sensitivity analysis
In practice, some UCCs might outsource the last mile delivery activities to other compa-
nies (e.g., Nijmegen UCC, as reported by Duin et al. (2016)). Under this strategy, the UCC 
will only be responsible for the cost of in-facility goods handling and sorting. However, 
such an outsourcing strategy could introduce some changes to the cost of last-mile deliv-
ery. In order to assess the feasibility of the cost allocation rules in such cases, we design the 
following sensitivity analysis, which is based on the following assumptions:
1. The total cost of last-mile delivery in the UCC network without outsourcing is equal to 
the total cost of last-mile delivery after implementing outsourcing strategy;
2. The total cost of last-mile delivery in UCC network without outsourcing is unequal to 
the cost of last-mile delivery after implementing outsourcing strategy (the cost of last-
mile delivery may be increased due to the expertise of the carrier and to economies of 
scale; alternatively, the cost of last-mile delivery may be decreased due to additional 
administrative costs.)
Table 6  Composite Cost Allocation Rules (€/parcel)
Types of 
stakeholders
50%LRS + 50%UES 50%LRS + 50%DES 80%LRS + 20%UES 80%LRS + 20%DES
(€) % (€) % (€) % (€) %
Supplier 0.89 19.41% 0.00 0.00% 0.36 7.86% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.64 35.88% 1.01 21.96% 1.56 34.06% 1.31 28.55%
UCC 2.05 44.71% 2.55 55.79% 2.66 58.08% 2.86 62.55%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 1.02 22.26% 0.00 0.00% 0.41 8.90%
Total 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00%
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5.1.1  Assumption 1: outsourcing without total cost changes
In case the outsourcing of the last-mile delivery GMP does not alter the total cost, the cost 
structure of the whole delivery network is reported in Table 7. The UCCs’ original cost is 
€0.99/parcel, local carriers’ original cost is €2.08/parcel. It can be noticed that, in this case, 
the final cost share for the UCC,—under LRS (€0.99/parcel), UES (€0.85/parcel), and DES 
(€0.70/parcel)—are below the best solutions which can be obtained when the last-mile 
delivery process is conducted in-house (€1.02/parcel). This can be seen as an incentive 
for UCCs to outsource such activities. Besides this, DES rules also reduce the cost for the 
LHC to 0.38; such a cost allocation scheme appears to be the best for relieving the cost for 
both LHCs and UCCs under a last-mile outsourcing strategy.
5.1.2  Assumption 2: outsourcing with total cost changes
The outsourcing of last-mile delivery activities could, however, cause changes in the total 
cost structure. In this case, several considerations can be developed, based on the cost of 
the last-mile delivery activities performed by an outsourced carrier. If the local carrier can 
keep its cost lower than €2.76/parcel (see in Table 8), the outsourcing strategy is conveni-
ent, from a UCC perspective, under all the principles (LRS, UES, and DES). Otherwise, 
cost allocation based on UES principle will be higher than the best solution provided by an 
in-house strategy (€1.02/parcel). As such, LRS and DES principles need to be preferred by 
the UCC (see Fig. 3).
The best results of cost allocation will be changed with the variation of the local car-
rier’s cost (details are shown in Fig. 4): if the local carrier can keep its urban delivery cost 
lower than €1.48/parcel (Table 9), UES will be the most convenient allocation rule for the 
Table 7  Cost allocations under the outsourcing strategy without total cost change (€/parcel)
Types of stakeholders LRS (€) LRS (%) UES (€) UES (%) DES (€) DES (%)
Supplier 0.00 0.00% 1.60 35.04% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.51 32.93% 1.60 35.04% 0.38 8.23%
UCC 0.99 21.63% 0.85 18.56% 0.70 15.45%
Local Carrier 2.08 45.44% 0.53 11.36% 1.75 38.16%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 1.75 38.16%
Total 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00% 4.58 100.00%
Table 8  Cost Allocation of UCC in Outsourcing Strategy with carriers cost in €2.76/parcel
Types of stakeholders LRS (€) LRS (%) UES (€) UES (%) DES (€) DES (%)
Supplier 0.00 0.00% 1.78 33.75% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.51 28.71% 1.78 33.75% 0.38 7.17%
UCC 0.99 18.82% 1.02 19.38% 0.70 13.45%
Local Carrier 2.76 52.47% 0.68 13.12% 2.09 39.69%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 2.09 39.69%
Total 5.26 100.00% 5.26 100.00% 5.26 100.00%
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UCC. Such a rule also allows the UCC to subsidise the activities of the LHC and local car-
riers. If the local carrier keeps its cost between €1.48/parcel and €2.64/parcel (Table 10), 
a DES rule produces a better-cost allocation. When considering the need to encourage 
LHCs to use the UCC, DES will always provide the most convenient solution, reducing the 
LHC’s extra cost to €0.38/parcel. When local carriers can keep last-mile costs under €1.70 
per parcel (Table 11), a UES allocation can also benefit the LHC (Fig. 5). Therefore, when 
the local carrier can keep its costs under €1.48/parcel (Table 9), the UES rule can provide 
the best solution for the UCC, while also providing partial financial relief to the LHC.
Fig. 3  Variation of UCC cost allocation under UES rule. A comparison of in-house and outsourced delivery 
options
Fig. 4  UCC cost allocations under different responsibility rules based on variations of the carrier’s cost
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5.2  Discussion
According to Taniguchi (2014), municipal UCCs (and, in general, urban logistics projects) 
should not depend too heavily on public finances. As such, municipalities should build, 
from the very beginning, mechanisms aimed at helping the start-up phase of UCC and 
achieving financial sustainability through cost-reduction and economies of scale (Tanigu-
chi, 2014).
Within this context, the illustrated case study has shown that the proposed allocation 
rules can provide municipalities with useful tools. Indeed, UCCs have the potential to 
benefit, under certain conditions, from both UES and DES allocations, as these principles 
enact suppliers’ and customers’ participation in UCC operating costs. This is aligned with 
the empirical advice provided by Kiba-Janiak (2016), stating that, despite their individ-
ual rationality, stakeholders may perceive as fair the regulatory role of municipalities. In 
Table 9  Cost Allocation of UCC in Outsourcing Strategy with carriers cost in €1.48/parcel
Types of stakeholders LRS (€) LRS (%) UES (€) UES (%) DES (€) DES (%)
Supplier 0.00 0.00% 1.46 36.56% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.51 37.94% 1.46 36.56% 0.38 9.48%
UCC 0.99 24.87% 0.70 17.59% 0.70 17.78%
Local Carrier 1.48 37.19% 0.36 9.30% 1.45 36.37%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 1.45 36.37%
Total 3.98 100.00% 3.98 100.00% 3.98 100.00%
Table 10  Cost Allocation of UCC in Outsourcing Strategy with carriers cost in €2.64/parcel
Types of stakeholders LRS (€) LRS (%) UES (€) UES (%) DES (€) DES (%)
Supplier 0.00 0.00% 1.75 33.95% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.51 29.38% 1.75 33.95% 0.38 7.34%
UCC 0.99 19.26% 0.98 19.26% 0.70 13.76%
Local Carrier 2.64 51.36% 0.66 12.84% 2.03 39.45%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 2.03 39.45%
Total 5.14 100.00% 5.14 100.00% 5.14 100.00%
Table 11  Cost Allocation of LHC in Outsourcing Strategy with carriers cost equal to €1.70/parcel
Types of stakeholders LRS (€) LRS (%) UES (€) UES (%) DES (€) DES (%)
Supplier 0.00 0.00% 1.51 35.95% 0.00 0.00%
LHC 1.51 35.95% 1.51 35.95% 0.38 8.99%
UCC 0.99 23.57% 0.75 17.98% 0.70 16.85%
Local Carrier 1.70 40.48% 0.43 10.12% 1.56 37.08%
Customer 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 1.56 37.08%
Total 4.20 100.00% 4.20 100.00% 4.20 100.00%
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particular, the paper has dealt with a specific UCC delivery network case study. Comparing 
with the original structure of logistical costs, we find out that a UES rule provides the most 
convenient solution for the UCC. Also, a DES rule benefits both the LHC and the UCC 
(see Table 4).
Our analysis is extended to the case of an UCC which is outsourcing its last-mile deliv-
ery activities. Interestingly, if the outsourcing process does not modify the cost structure 
of the logistical network, then outsourcing the last-mile delivery is always beneficial to the 
UCC. This result is, interestingly, obtained regardless of the cost-allocation policy adopted 
by the LA.
However, this assumption might be quite ideal. Therefore, our analysis has turned 
to a more realistic case, involving a change in the cost structure caused by the out-
sourcing of the last-mile distribution. In this case, results are less straightforward. A 
DES rule may be set to benefit the UCC, if local carriers’ costs are high (see Fig. 4). 
Moreover, a DES rule might also be convenient for incentivising LHCs participation 
in UCCs (see Fig. 5). From the UCC perspective, a change in the optimal allocation 
rule occurs if the costs of the local carrier (who are in charge of last-mile delivery 
processes) are larger or lesser than some critical values, which have been identified 
through our analysis. Our method allows for the numerical evaluation of such thresh-
olds and may provide a very practical tool for LAs interested in evaluating the effect of 
specific cost allocation rules.
As such, if local carriers’ costs are larger/smaller than some critical thresholds, 
LAs may, accordingly, decide to implement the right policy in order to safeguard the 
financial viability of the UCCs. Undoubtedly, local authorities might choose the pol-
icy that safeguards the financial viability of the UCC (and not necessarily the one of 
other stakeholders). Also, the implementation of composite allocation rules could be 
adopted, in an attempt to implement lighter mitigation strategies. It has to be remarked, 
though, that as these schemes might cause the increase in costs to be faced by other 
Fig. 5  LHC cost allocations under different responsibility rules based on variations of the carrier’s cost
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stakeholders, such a solution should be implemented in practice through strong politi-
cal interventions and thorough consultation and engagement.
In terms of comparison with the recent literature, our results are consistent with 
the recent literature. For instance, Van Heeswijk et  al. (2020) highlight the financial 
unsustainability of UCCs, providing, de facto, the motivation for our analysis, which 
is aimed at finding optimal cost allocation policies that are capable of mitigating the 
original structure of logistical costs. This is similar to the work performed by Dahlberg 
et al. (2018); however, this study assumes that LAs are willing to face some costs in 
order to ensure a stable collaboration among stakeholders. Such a requirement is a 
strong one and assumes a financial intervention of LAs in UCC networks. The focus 
in Dahlberg et al. (2018) is on the stability of cooperation; conversely, our focus is to 
define policies that promote the fairness of cooperation among stakeholders. In gen-
eral, stability and fairness are distinct concepts in cooperative game theory.
6  Conclusions
Recently, many local authorities have set up Urban Consolidation Centres (UCC) for deal-
ing with challenges arising from the negative impacts of logistics in urban contexts through 
a freight consolidation strategy. It has been shown that such facilities can contribute to the 
improvement of environmental quality in cities by reducing air pollution and alleviating 
congestion. Notwithstanding these encouraging premises, the number of successful UCC 
projects in Europe is very low, with most of the UCCs fail to achieve financial sustainabil-
ity and to operate autonomously after the initial experimental phase that might be heavily 
supported by public funds.
In order to propose mechanisms that could favour the financial sustainability of 
UCC systems, this research has developed an adaptation of established game-theoretic 
approaches to the problem of responsibility and cost allocation among stakeholders par-
ticipating in a UCC delivery network. Proposed approaches are inspired by extended 
responsibility principles that have been previously applied to the supply chain context. 
A solution based on the Shapley Value concept has been employed in order to calculate 
numerical results of cost allocations, under different responsibility scenarios. Applications 
of the model to a real-world scenario have been developed, along with a sensitivity analysis 
which has evaluated the suitability of the approach to different scenarios, and the possi-
bility of applying the developed cost allocation rules in order to incentivise stakeholders’ 
participation in UCC projects.
As the case study has revealed, allocation schemes based on an extended responsibil-
ity concept (UES, DES and resulting composite rules) can enhance the viability of UCCs, 
alleviating the need for public subsidies through suppliers’ and customers’ participation 
in UCC operating costs. As these schemes might cause increases in costs faced by other 
stakeholders, it has also been remarked that these solutions should be implemented through 
strong political interventions and thorough consultation and engagement.
The proposed rules have been validated on secondary data based on a real-world case 
study; future researches could be aimed at investigating the practical implementation of the 
proposed rules through primary data to be collected in collaboration with Local Authori-
ties. Also, the cost allocation scheme could be extended in order to take into account more 
complex delivery networks and to evaluate the impact of reverse logistics operations.
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Appendix
Parameter values for the UCC case – adapted from Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017b)
Parameters Value
Average distance from the depot to the delivery zone 11.2 km
Average speed of the vehicle from the depot to the delivery zone 30.70Km/hour
Radius of the service area 7.16 km
Average speed of the vehicle within the delivery zone 30.70 km/hour
Vehicle travel distance from the depot to the UCC location 8 km
Average speed of the vehicle between the depot and the UCC 36.84 km/hour
Maximum vehicle capacity 212 parcels
Total expenses for UCC services €3.75/parcel
Average parcels received per customers 2.5 parcels/customer
Types of vehicle used in the route for direct delivery Light commercial 
vehicle (less than 
3.5 T)
Types of vehicle used in the route between LHC depot and UCC 
Types of vehicle used by the UCC in the urban delivery route
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